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TECHNOLOGY
The success of the TCP/IP protocols has, in part, emanated from the architectural openness of these network standards and the participatory openness and transparency of the underlying standards process. Yet recently, concerns about interoperability have turned to other architectural layers of information exchange and some have suggested that proprietary standards are constricting architectural openness at the application layer. Defining “architectural openness,” however, is a highly controversial exercise and many competing interests have a stake in the outcome of this debate. Hundreds of organizations establish standards for global information exchange and many have different definitions of openness, interoperability, and compatibility. Those outside the standards-setting process have their own definitions, sometimes conflating independent technical variables of the underlying standards specification, the actual code, the product implementing the standards, and the resulting interoperability and functionality of the product.
Defining Openness
First what is an "open standard" This discussion I think refers to an "open technical compatibility standard"
This is based on the defintion of the term "technical standard": A codified and quantified mutual agreement created by an authority, committee or market. (ref Hayek Rules and Order) The term codified indicates that the standard is independent of an implementation. The term quantified indicates it is a technical standard, i.e. measureable.
There are five successions of standards: symbols, measurement, similarity, compatibility and adaptability (ref http://www.csrstds.com/IECChallenge2006.pdf). I think this discussion focuses on compatibility standards.
The Open Source Initiative has put forward a set of Open Standards Requirements for Open Source. The concepts of open standards and open source have many common aspects, and it is the strong belief of the Open Source Initiative that a standard defined (or left undefined) in such a way as to preclude an open source implementation cannot legitimately be called an "open standard".
It may be confusing to consider Open Source, which enables rapid change, and Open Standards, which define periods of stability, as similar. When a standard is created it will (and should) inhibit change. For a discussion of the similarities and differences between the two see "Cathedrals, Libraries and Bazaars," at http://www.csrstds.com/cathedrals.html
- What counts as an open technical standard and what are the implications of de jure versus de facto standards assent?
De jure and de facto (confusing terms) standards are not relevant any more. Historically de jure standards were from an authority or committee and de facto were market accepted. Now all compatibility standards must achieve market acceptance. Of course, such market acceptance may be created by regulation.
Nevertheless, a technical standard that can be identified but not practiced (due to trade secrets or other legal injunctions) cannot be considered "open".
- To what extent is architectural openness still a concern for information standards and what are its consequences?
Architectural openness refers to modularity (among the same or related implementers) not compatibility (among independent implementers). But both modularity and compatibility are crucially dependent upon the completeness of the technical specification. Not true. Modularity is not dependent on the completeness of the technical specification as it is within one group. Compatibility is dependent on the completeness of the technical specification. Public availability of the technical specification should be ONE (of 10) determining facts as to whether a standard is "open" (free for anybody to practice) or "closed" (limited to a select group of implementors).
- Do the technical discussions of architectural openness simply reflect underlying political, economic, and legal undercurrents?
The question is confusing.
Some of the confusion can be reduced, if we find clarity about underlying steps. As noted, standards inhibit change. We can transform this perception, regarding a moment in time, into a dynamic description. We will also encompass both standardization and innovation.
The events of interest proceed via an oft-repeated, primitive cycle: if first we set a standard, which freezes the technology, later we may come back to consider new innovations, which will break the standard but could allow potentially greater productivity – if, that is, we will re-enter the cycle with yet another round of standardization, and of course then even later, yet more innovation ... And so forth into the future, repeating this cycle of standardization and innovation. Practice established by the IETF typifies use of this cycle, for one signal case in point.
‘Openness’ takes numerous meanings, clearly. We may clarify what definitions to use by setting ‘openness’ into the events of this primitive cycle. That is, when we work within the context of events, we can see different options for applying the notion ‘open.’
The innovation phase is generally the opposite of ‘open’ – innovators take to themselves for a period of competition among new ideas. It is the standardization phase where prospects for ‘openness’ arise; what are the candidates for defining ‘open’ then?
One serious candidate is the character of the process to reach a standard. Standardization uses the opposite of the competitive fervor that serves innovation; instead, a social hierarchy organizes to produce concurrence on a standard approach.
• Are all voices heard; is the criterion for selection meritocratic? Or, is there bullying by those with a vested interest in some outcome?
• Are potential obstacles to adoption, notably intellectual property rights, quelled? Or, has the standards process really focused on a single individual interest?
The cycle is Schumpeterian dynamics, with periodic rise and fall across a competition of ideas. Once a given standard emerges, a separate tableau operates with, instead, a ‘commodity competition’ among vendors of products. Another candidate for ‘open’ is interoperability among these real-world products.
• Does the standard specify a singular enough approach to allow interoperation? Or, do multiple choices, in the standard, sew confusion? (if so, we look back to the standards setting)
• Do vendors comply? Or, do they step prematurely into a next innovation phase with attempts to differentiate themselves?
The whole cycle, standardization to innovation and then repeated, is one description for open source. The integrity of the whole process can also be a candidate to define ‘open.’
The – many – permutations that further specify myriad details of the two phases will lead to other candidates for the definition. Then our question is how usefully to apply multiple instances for the one notion, ‘open.’
Since the SIIT 2001 Proceedings are offline, go here for a very brief review of this formulation, scrolling down to the paper Yin and yang.
Defining Interoperability
- What constitutes a technical definition of interoperability?
Interoperability is multi-layer (referring to OSI layers) compatibility.
Principles and Values of Architectural Design
- What architectural principles of information exchange, if any, can inform theories of open technical standards (e.g. simplicity, universal access, ubiquity, end-to-end access, architectural flexibility, security, backward compatibility, scalability)?
This commentator finds the use of the term architecture here confusing. A ten parameter description of openness is available at http://www.csrstds.com/openstds.pdf
Standards Setting Organizations
- How extensive is the mosaic of standards-setting organizations and how divergent are their definitions of technical interoperability?
Confusing use of terms. Is technical interoperability better or worse than application interoperability?
ECONOMICS
Because standards exert control over technology and those who use technology, they represent a site of controversy mediating between competing economic interests. Large multinational corporations have historically dominated the standards process; influence over standards can produce significant economic advantage. Some entities have used intellectual property rights to maximize royalty revenue from adopted standards. Others have used standards as part of product-marketing strategies to create barriers to interoperability and restraints on competition. Economists have often viewed open standards through market effects: providing a level playing field for competition in developing products based on these open standards. Governments have recognized the importance of standards to bolster economic competitiveness and as trade barriers and have influenced standards development and adoption accordingly.
Economic Openness and Innovation
- What would constitute an economic definition of open standards?
Joel West (2004) defines "‘open’ for a standard as meaning rights to the standard are made available to economic actors other than the sponsor."
The following questions confuse similarity standards which inhibit variation (but may increase choice) and compatibility standards which make choice possible.
- What is the relationship between the economic openness of a standard and innovation?
- From a user perspective, do open standards mandates produce or inhibit product choice?
Political Economy
- What is the distinction between the economic effects of open standards in product implementation versus the political economy of how standards, once developed, are adopted?
Global Trade Policies
- What is the relationship between the openness of standards and global trade policies?
Global Economic Competitiveness
- How is the concept of “openness” used to advance economic interests?
- Is there anything unique about the role of ICT standards as mediating between competing economic interests?
POLITICS
The standards development process involves complex public policy decisions. Though not written or promulgated by legislatures, states, or courts, standards create regulatory structures that transcend international boundaries and affect developing countries and others without a direct voice in standards selection. The organizations involved in setting standards exhibit disparate levels of participatory and informational openness and many do not adhere to principles of due process and consensus. Non-participatory, non-transparent standards development based on closed membership and fee-based access to specifications precludes the possibility of direct multi-stakeholder involvement or open access to standards deliberations and specifications. Once developed, government policies and advocacy toward specific standards often intersect with national economic objectives, military strategy, or political ideology. Some governments have developed ICT procurement policies mandating that purchases be based on open standards. Rationales for these policies have included political requirements of embracing democratic principles of openness and technical requirements for greater interoperability, but finding precise definitions of openness and interoperability has been difficult.
Standards and the Public Interest
- How can the public interest realistically enter the Internet standards process?
- To what extent are open standards democratically imperative in politically important areas such as electronic voting and access to public records?
Open Standards and Developing Countries
- How can standards decisions reflect the requirements of developing countries?
Best Practices for Internet Standards Governance
- What are the consequences of the various approaches standards organizations take regarding procedural and informational openness, membership requirements, fees, due process, and consensus?
- Can theories of democracy inform discussions of the role of standards institutions and the extent to which standards processes should incorporate participatory and informational openness and transparency?
The Role of National and International Government Agencies
- What is the appropriate responsibility of national governments and international governing bodies in open standards relative to procurement, regulatory intervention and oversight, and standards production?
- Can and should international governance bodies develop a legitimating system of accreditation of open standards principles for standards-setting organizations?
- In what ways can standards adoption policies bolster political objectives or reflect prevailing global political tensions? What role do transnational standards play in mediating these tensions?
LAW
Technical standards are a form of transnational global rulemaking, one that often operates independently of and invisibly to traditional legal systems. Standards represent a tenacious form of rulemaking because of the conservative momentum of user and developer investments, institutional commitments, and the influence of powerful multinational companies seeking to preserve or advance industry hegemony. The esoteric and technical complexity of protocols and the closed membership approaches of some standards bodies serve to obfuscate the legal considerations and effects of technical specifications. Additionally, legal issues related to intellectual property rights, patents, and antitrust are at the heart of controversies and key decision criteria about what constitutes an open standard. The organizations setting technical standards for information exchange have divergent policies about whether standards should be royalty-free or available based on so-called Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (RAND) terms and whether members are compelled to disclose patents and other intellectual property rights relevant to the implementation of a standard.
Standards as Transnational Law
- To what extent, if at all, are technical standards a unique method of transnational rulemaking? If so, what are the implications of using such processes, and can technical standards be understood within existing theoretical frameworks of law?
Legal Definitions of Openness
- What legal arguments can help theorize definitions of "openness" in standards?
Intellectual Property Rights and Patents
- Is it necessary to have one approach to intellectual property rights in standards or does a diversity of approaches provide a self-regulating market mechanism?
- What are the legal considerations for and against defining “open” standards as those that are royalty-free?
- Could independently defined costs determine RAND terms and who would decide fee structures?
- What should count as RAND licensing of open standards?
Copyright and Standards
- Should standards organizations be able to “own” standards, especially those mandated by law? Should standards be eligible for copyright protection? What are the global jurisdictional issues and trade issues created by proprietary versus open technical standards?
